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vulnerability / NVI-00010560 / Revision 4

LiteLLM: Privilege Escalation to Proxy Admin via Cross-Domain Reuse of the Salt Key

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for litellm, litellm, litellm, litellm, litellm. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-7hp6-4w63-5g45CVE-2026-114612

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

9.9 high

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

EPSS

0.319%

FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.24995. Missing scores are unknown.

As of · FIRST EPSS

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

litellm

source listed
  • >= 1.91.0, < 1.100.4

### Summary An authenticated user with `internal_user` privileges can escalate to `proxy_admin` and achieve remote code execution. The proxy uses one encryption key for two purposes: sealing secrets at rest and minting session tokens. An attacker exploits this by requesting a new API key with a crafted metadata field containing a forged admin credential as the "secret" value. The proxy encrypts and returns this payload. When this value is then presented as a bearer token, the proxy decrypts it, trusts the forged admin identity, and grants full administrative access, including the ability to execute arbitrary commands via the MCP stdio endpoint. ### Affected versions Versions later than 1.91.0 are exploitable in the default configuration. Versions 1.87.0 through 1.90.x are exploitable only if `EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=true` was explicitly set. ### Mitigation Upgrade to a patched version as soon as possible. If you cannot upgrade immediately, set `EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=false`. This disables the vulnerable authentication path but also breaks CLI SSO and Claude Code gateway login. ### Impact An internal user can escalate to proxy admin and execute arbitrary commands on the host.

GitHub Advisory Database

litellm

source listed
  • >= 1.101.0, < 1.101.3

### Summary An authenticated user with `internal_user` privileges can escalate to `proxy_admin` and achieve remote code execution. The proxy uses one encryption key for two purposes: sealing secrets at rest and minting session tokens. An attacker exploits this by requesting a new API key with a crafted metadata field containing a forged admin credential as the "secret" value. The proxy encrypts and returns this payload. When this value is then presented as a bearer token, the proxy decrypts it, trusts the forged admin identity, and grants full administrative access, including the ability to execute arbitrary commands via the MCP stdio endpoint. ### Affected versions Versions later than 1.91.0 are exploitable in the default configuration. Versions 1.87.0 through 1.90.x are exploitable only if `EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=true` was explicitly set. ### Mitigation Upgrade to a patched version as soon as possible. If you cannot upgrade immediately, set `EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=false`. This disables the vulnerable authentication path but also breaks CLI SSO and Claude Code gateway login. ### Impact An internal user can escalate to proxy admin and execute arbitrary commands on the host.

GitHub Advisory Database

litellm

source listed
  • >= 1.102.0, < 1.102.2

### Summary An authenticated user with `internal_user` privileges can escalate to `proxy_admin` and achieve remote code execution. The proxy uses one encryption key for two purposes: sealing secrets at rest and minting session tokens. An attacker exploits this by requesting a new API key with a crafted metadata field containing a forged admin credential as the "secret" value. The proxy encrypts and returns this payload. When this value is then presented as a bearer token, the proxy decrypts it, trusts the forged admin identity, and grants full administrative access, including the ability to execute arbitrary commands via the MCP stdio endpoint. ### Affected versions Versions later than 1.91.0 are exploitable in the default configuration. Versions 1.87.0 through 1.90.x are exploitable only if `EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=true` was explicitly set. ### Mitigation Upgrade to a patched version as soon as possible. If you cannot upgrade immediately, set `EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=false`. This disables the vulnerable authentication path but also breaks CLI SSO and Claude Code gateway login. ### Impact An internal user can escalate to proxy admin and execute arbitrary commands on the host.

GitHub Advisory Database

litellm

source listed
  • >= 1.103.0, < 1.103.1

### Summary An authenticated user with `internal_user` privileges can escalate to `proxy_admin` and achieve remote code execution. The proxy uses one encryption key for two purposes: sealing secrets at rest and minting session tokens. An attacker exploits this by requesting a new API key with a crafted metadata field containing a forged admin credential as the "secret" value. The proxy encrypts and returns this payload. When this value is then presented as a bearer token, the proxy decrypts it, trusts the forged admin identity, and grants full administrative access, including the ability to execute arbitrary commands via the MCP stdio endpoint. ### Affected versions Versions later than 1.91.0 are exploitable in the default configuration. Versions 1.87.0 through 1.90.x are exploitable only if `EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=true` was explicitly set. ### Mitigation Upgrade to a patched version as soon as possible. If you cannot upgrade immediately, set `EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=false`. This disables the vulnerable authentication path but also breaks CLI SSO and Claude Code gateway login. ### Impact An internal user can escalate to proxy admin and execute arbitrary commands on the host.

GitHub Advisory Database

litellm

source listed
  • >= 1.104.0rc1, < 1.104.0rc2

### Summary An authenticated user with `internal_user` privileges can escalate to `proxy_admin` and achieve remote code execution. The proxy uses one encryption key for two purposes: sealing secrets at rest and minting session tokens. An attacker exploits this by requesting a new API key with a crafted metadata field containing a forged admin credential as the "secret" value. The proxy encrypts and returns this payload. When this value is then presented as a bearer token, the proxy decrypts it, trusts the forged admin identity, and grants full administrative access, including the ability to execute arbitrary commands via the MCP stdio endpoint. ### Affected versions Versions later than 1.91.0 are exploitable in the default configuration. Versions 1.87.0 through 1.90.x are exploitable only if `EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=true` was explicitly set. ### Mitigation Upgrade to a patched version as soon as possible. If you cannot upgrade immediately, set `EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=false`. This disables the vulnerable authentication path but also breaks CLI SSO and Claude Code gateway login. ### Impact An internal user can escalate to proxy admin and execute arbitrary commands on the host.

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-7hp6-4w63-5g45 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. CVE-2026-114612 ↗

    FIRST EPSS · official catalog

    Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 4 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  2. Revision 3 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  3. Revision 2 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  4. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗