vulnerability / NVI-00010655 / Revision 1
Django REST framework: TokenProxy.delete() reports success and revokes nothing
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for djangorestframework. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
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7.4 high
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As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
djangorestframework
source listed>= 3.12.0, < 3.18.2
### Summary Deleting an authentication token through `TokenProxy` silently deletes nothing. The call raises no exception and reports success, the database row survives, and the token keeps authenticating. Any application, admin integration or operational script that revokes credentials by calling `.delete()` on a `TokenProxy` instance believes it has revoked a token that is still live. ### Details `TokenProxy` overrides `pk` to return the user id (`rest_framework/authtoken/models.py:49-63`): ```python @property def pk(self): return self.user_id ``` The concrete `Token` model keys on `key`, not on an integer id. `Model.delete()` builds its delete query from `pk`, so it emits: ```sql DELETE FROM "authtoken_token" WHERE "authtoken_token"."key" IN ('1') ``` That matches a user id against the 40-character key column. Nothing matches, nothing raises, and the call returns `(0, {'authtoken.TokenProxy': 0})`. DRF already ships two workarounds for this same identity mismatch instead of a fix. In `rest_framework/authtoken/admin.py`, `TokenAdmin.delete_model` re-fetches the concrete row: ```python def delete_model(self, request, obj): Token.objects.get(key=obj.key).delete()
03 / Response
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04 / Limits
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05 / Provenance
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- GHSA-xw6w-gcfp-cf8m ↗
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- Revision 1 ·
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