vulnerability / NVI-00010667 / Revision 1
gitoxide gix: untrusted .git/config disables filesystem .git-protection path checks via unfiltered protect_options()
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for gix. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.3 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
gix
source listed>= 0.88.0, <= 0.89.0
## Summary In the `gix` crate, `Cache::protect_options()` in `gix/src/config/cache/access.rs` reads the three filesystem path-protection settings (`core.protectHFS`, `core.protectNTFS`, and `gitoxide.core.protectWindows`) with the unfiltered `gix_config::File::boolean()` accessor instead of the trust-aware `boolean_filter()` accessor used by every other security-critical config read in the same file. When a repository is opened with reduced trust (an ownership mismatch, which maps `.git/config` sections to `Trust::Reduced`), these protection settings should not be honored from the untrusted repository-local config. Because the trust filter is skipped, an attacker who controls a repository's `.git/config` on a shared filesystem can set `core.protectNTFS = false` and/or `core.protectHFS = false`, disabling the `.git` path-confusion checks that run during checkout, index creation, merge, and tree editing. On case-insensitive filesystems this lets crafted tree entries resolve to the `.git` directory and overwrite hooks or config. ## Root Cause Repositories opened under `Trust::Reduced` install a section filter (`is_trusted`) so that security-relevant settings coming from an untruste
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-q54r-jf2p-rfr2 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
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