vulnerability / NVI-00010671 / Revision 4
Sentry-Javascript: Middleware Bypass when using Tunnel route
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @sentry/nextjs, @sentry/nextjs, @sentry/nextjs. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
9.1 CRITICAL (4.0)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.510%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.43524. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@sentry/nextjs
source listed>= 9.36.0, < 9.47.2
### Impact The `tunnelRoute` option makes the SDK send browser events to a path on your own Next.js server (for example `/monitoring`), where a rewrite forwards them to Sentry to prevent ad blockers from blocking them. To keep those envelope requests from being rejected by your middleware, the SDK skips middleware for them. The middleware skip was wider than the rewrite. The rewrite only serves requests to the tunnel path itself with the `o` and `p` parameters set. The skip applied to anything under the tunnel path. Requests in that gap go to your application instead of Sentry, and your middleware never runs on them. Skipping middleware does not grant the request any privileges. Routes that check the session server-side are still protected. You are affected only if **all** of the following are true: 1. `tunnelRoute` is set (a string path or `true`), 2. your app is built with **webpack** (Turbopack builds are not affected), 3. some route of your application resolves under the tunnel path. That could be a direct collision (`/monitoring/foo` with `tunnelRoute: '/monitoring'`) or a dynamic segment at the route root (`app/[locale]/…`), which matches any first path segment, and 4. y
@sentry/nextjs
source listed>= 10.0.0-alpha.0, < 10.75.2
### Impact The `tunnelRoute` option makes the SDK send browser events to a path on your own Next.js server (for example `/monitoring`), where a rewrite forwards them to Sentry to prevent ad blockers from blocking them. To keep those envelope requests from being rejected by your middleware, the SDK skips middleware for them. The middleware skip was wider than the rewrite. The rewrite only serves requests to the tunnel path itself with the `o` and `p` parameters set. The skip applied to anything under the tunnel path. Requests in that gap go to your application instead of Sentry, and your middleware never runs on them. Skipping middleware does not grant the request any privileges. Routes that check the session server-side are still protected. You are affected only if **all** of the following are true: 1. `tunnelRoute` is set (a string path or `true`), 2. your app is built with **webpack** (Turbopack builds are not affected), 3. some route of your application resolves under the tunnel path. That could be a direct collision (`/monitoring/foo` with `tunnelRoute: '/monitoring'`) or a dynamic segment at the route root (`app/[locale]/…`), which matches any first path segment, and 4. y
@sentry/nextjs
source listed>= 11.0.0-alpha.0, < 11.0.0-rc.1
### Impact The `tunnelRoute` option makes the SDK send browser events to a path on your own Next.js server (for example `/monitoring`), where a rewrite forwards them to Sentry to prevent ad blockers from blocking them. To keep those envelope requests from being rejected by your middleware, the SDK skips middleware for them. The middleware skip was wider than the rewrite. The rewrite only serves requests to the tunnel path itself with the `o` and `p` parameters set. The skip applied to anything under the tunnel path. Requests in that gap go to your application instead of Sentry, and your middleware never runs on them. Skipping middleware does not grant the request any privileges. Routes that check the session server-side are still protected. You are affected only if **all** of the following are true: 1. `tunnelRoute` is set (a string path or `true`), 2. your app is built with **webpack** (Turbopack builds are not affected), 3. some route of your application resolves under the tunnel path. That could be a direct collision (`/monitoring/foo` with `tunnelRoute: '/monitoring'`) or a dynamic segment at the route root (`app/[locale]/…`), which matches any first path segment, and 4. y
@sentry/nextjs
source listedSEMVER: introduced 9.36.0; fixed 9.47.2
### Impact The `tunnelRoute` option makes the SDK send browser events to a path on your own Next.js server (for example `/monitoring`), where a rewrite forwards them to Sentry to prevent ad blockers from blocking them. To keep those envelope requests from being rejected by your middleware, the SDK skips middleware for them. The middleware skip was wider than the rewrite. The rewrite only serves requests to the tunnel path itself with the `o` and `p` parameters set. The skip applied to anything under the tunnel path. Requests in that gap go to your application instead of Sentry, and your middleware never runs on them. Skipping middleware does not grant the request any privileges. Routes that check the session server-side are still protected. You are affected only if **all** of the following are true: 1. `tunnelRoute` is set (a string path or `true`), 2. your app is built with **webpack** (Turbopack builds are not affected), 3. some route of your application resolves under the tunnel path. That could be a direct collision (`/monitoring/foo` with `tunnelRoute: '/monitoring'`) or a dynamic segment at the route root (`app/[locale]/…`), which matches any first path segment, and 4. y
@sentry/nextjs
source listedSEMVER: introduced 10.0.0-alpha.0; fixed 10.75.2
### Impact The `tunnelRoute` option makes the SDK send browser events to a path on your own Next.js server (for example `/monitoring`), where a rewrite forwards them to Sentry to prevent ad blockers from blocking them. To keep those envelope requests from being rejected by your middleware, the SDK skips middleware for them. The middleware skip was wider than the rewrite. The rewrite only serves requests to the tunnel path itself with the `o` and `p` parameters set. The skip applied to anything under the tunnel path. Requests in that gap go to your application instead of Sentry, and your middleware never runs on them. Skipping middleware does not grant the request any privileges. Routes that check the session server-side are still protected. You are affected only if **all** of the following are true: 1. `tunnelRoute` is set (a string path or `true`), 2. your app is built with **webpack** (Turbopack builds are not affected), 3. some route of your application resolves under the tunnel path. That could be a direct collision (`/monitoring/foo` with `tunnelRoute: '/monitoring'`) or a dynamic segment at the route root (`app/[locale]/…`), which matches any first path segment, and 4. y
@sentry/nextjs
source listedSEMVER: introduced 11.0.0-alpha.0; fixed 11.0.0-rc.1
### Impact The `tunnelRoute` option makes the SDK send browser events to a path on your own Next.js server (for example `/monitoring`), where a rewrite forwards them to Sentry to prevent ad blockers from blocking them. To keep those envelope requests from being rejected by your middleware, the SDK skips middleware for them. The middleware skip was wider than the rewrite. The rewrite only serves requests to the tunnel path itself with the `o` and `p` parameters set. The skip applied to anything under the tunnel path. Requests in that gap go to your application instead of Sentry, and your middleware never runs on them. Skipping middleware does not grant the request any privileges. Routes that check the session server-side are still protected. You are affected only if **all** of the following are true: 1. `tunnelRoute` is set (a string path or `true`), 2. your app is built with **webpack** (Turbopack builds are not affected), 3. some route of your application resolves under the tunnel path. That could be a direct collision (`/monitoring/foo` with `tunnelRoute: '/monitoring'`) or a dynamic segment at the route root (`app/[locale]/…`), which matches any first path segment, and 4. y
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 9.47.2 for @sentry/nextjs. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 10.75.2 for @sentry/nextjs. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 11.0.0-rc.1 for @sentry/nextjs. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-mchm-gjx6-7h55 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-mchm-gjx6-7h55 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-114139 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-114139 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.