vulnerability / NVI-00010753 / Revision 3
body-parser vulnerable to Denial of Service via trailing bytes after a compressed request body
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for body-parser, body-parser. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
7.5 HIGH (3.1)
ce714d77-add3-4f53-aff5-83d477b104bb severity; no combined Null risk score.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
body-parser
source listed>= 2.0.0, < 2.4.0
### Impact A single request can crash any application using `body-parser` with default options. When a request carries a `Content-Encoding` (for example `gzip`), `body-parser` pipes it into a decompression stream and, after reading the body, leaves that stream piped with no error listener. A payload of one valid compressed frame followed by trailing bytes decodes and the application responds normally, but the trailing bytes then reach the already-finished decoder, which emits an error that is re-thrown as an uncaught exception and terminates the process. No authentication or matching route is required, since parsing runs before routing. ### Patches Fixed in body-parser 2.4.0 and 1.20.9. Upgrade to one of these versions. ### Workarounds Pass `inflate: false` to the body-parser middleware if the application does not need to accept compressed request bodies. This rejects encoded requests before any decompression stream is created.
body-parser
source listed< 1.20.9
### Impact A single request can crash any application using `body-parser` with default options. When a request carries a `Content-Encoding` (for example `gzip`), `body-parser` pipes it into a decompression stream and, after reading the body, leaves that stream piped with no error listener. A payload of one valid compressed frame followed by trailing bytes decodes and the application responds normally, but the trailing bytes then reach the already-finished decoder, which emits an error that is re-thrown as an uncaught exception and terminates the process. No authentication or matching route is required, since parsing runs before routing. ### Patches Fixed in body-parser 2.4.0 and 1.20.9. Upgrade to one of these versions. ### Workarounds Pass `inflate: false` to the body-parser middleware if the application does not need to accept compressed request bodies. This rejects encoded requests before any decompression stream is created.
body-parser
source listedSEMVER: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.4.0
### Impact A single request can crash any application using `body-parser` with default options. When a request carries a `Content-Encoding` (for example `gzip`), `body-parser` pipes it into a decompression stream and, after reading the body, leaves that stream piped with no error listener. A payload of one valid compressed frame followed by trailing bytes decodes and the application responds normally, but the trailing bytes then reach the already-finished decoder, which emits an error that is re-thrown as an uncaught exception and terminates the process. No authentication or matching route is required, since parsing runs before routing. ### Patches Fixed in body-parser 2.4.0 and 1.20.9. Upgrade to one of these versions. ### Workarounds Pass `inflate: false` to the body-parser middleware if the application does not need to accept compressed request bodies. This rejects encoded requests before any decompression stream is created.
body-parser
source listedSEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 1.20.9
### Impact A single request can crash any application using `body-parser` with default options. When a request carries a `Content-Encoding` (for example `gzip`), `body-parser` pipes it into a decompression stream and, after reading the body, leaves that stream piped with no error listener. A payload of one valid compressed frame followed by trailing bytes decodes and the application responds normally, but the trailing bytes then reach the already-finished decoder, which emits an error that is re-thrown as an uncaught exception and terminates the process. No authentication or matching route is required, since parsing runs before routing. ### Patches Fixed in body-parser 2.4.0 and 1.20.9. Upgrade to one of these versions. ### Workarounds Pass `inflate: false` to the body-parser middleware if the application does not need to accept compressed request bodies. This rejects encoded requests before any decompression stream is created.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.0 for body-parser. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.20.9 for body-parser. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-27r3-jxmh-p828 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-27r3-jxmh-p828 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-111181 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.