supply chain event / NVI-00010799 / Revision 1
Malicious code in css-display-reading-polyfill (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for css-display-reading-polyfill. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
css-display-reading-polyfill
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (b397798b7209f1094c33dc3ed721d4a3ef0536065317bd06bae76e33dd505334) The package ships payload.bundle.min.js, which on load runs an IIFE that invokes child_process.execSync to run id, whoami, and uname, collects os.hostname(), node version, process.platform, and pid, and transmits the results to the hardcoded collector https://webhook.site/5e52603d-f802-4a6f-b91b-43c3a5b45b6b via fetch and https.get. The published name impersonates an internal Wix thunderbolt module: shipped thunderbolt manifest JSON files declare this package as the loader entry for dozens of Wix component registry names (Container, StylableButton, MasterPage,...) and nine host registries (thunderboltRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry,...), with "shared":["payload.bundle.min.js"] and components mapped to that bundle. index.js is a benign stub; the exfil code lives entirely in the bundle, so any Wix runtime that resolves these internal registry names from this public package executes the host-reconnaissance payload. This is a dependency-confusion active attack: installer-side shell command output and host identifiers are sent to an attacker-controlled, non-first-party endpoint. ---
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-c8vg-2r7m-hfch ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.