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supply chain event / NVI-00010818 / Revision 1

Malicious code in tx-broadcast-utils (RubyGems)

GitHub lists this malware advisory for tx-broadcast-utils. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-m56c-f68h-prj5

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

tx-broadcast-utils

source listed
  • = 1.0.0

## Source: amazon-inspector (60efdf159c3ce8550c985b3f19cbe72f2bfcae0266cb63fb8c0dd458b56b9901) The gem's native-extension script (ext/.../extconf.rb) embeds a base64-encoded Ruby payload that is eval'd at `gem install` time. The payload double-forks and detaches a background process which sleeps 20-40 minutes, reconstructs a C2 URL by XOR-decoding a hex blob to http://45.138.17.70:809/wgkit.tar.gz, downloads the tarball to /tmp/.w1.tgz, extracts it to /tmp/.w1, and executes wg_install.sh as the installing user. Execution is gated on anti-analysis checks that suppress the payload in CI, ephemeral/sandbox hostnames, generated usernames matching /uA\d+/, paths under /tmp or /opt/rubygems, and hosts with short uptime, and requires developer-machine signals such as ~/.ssh, ~/.gitconfig, and ~/.gem/credentials before firing. The advertised purpose (Bitcoin transaction broadcast helpers over public esplora endpoints) is a decoy: the shipped library only exposes a truncated BIP39 word list with no broadcast code, and the native extension's C source is an empty Init_ stub. The extconf.rb dropper is the gem's only functional component. --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/maliciou

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-m56c-f68h-prj5 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

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