supply chain event / NVI-00010906 / Revision 1
Malicious code in chai-as-testmode (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for chai-as-testmode. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
chai-as-testmode
source listed= 1.4.7
## Source: amazon-inspector (af5e91a44a2eb0773df19fce2096660c285bafbe846a5f09d8bb25ff0eba22b2) The package masquerades as the pino logging library (README badges and lib/ contents mimic pino) but ships a dropper at lib/initializeCaller.js. A self-executing IIFE POSTs the full process.env object to a base64-concealed endpoint that decodes to https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/b4dadd6a26d820d08596, using an 'x-secret-header: secret' header, and then passes the HTTP response body to new Function('require', response.data) with require handed in — executing attacker-returned JavaScript in the installer's Node process. The transmitted payload is the entire environment (not a single named variable), which on developer and CI machines typically includes NPM_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, AWS_* credentials, and other CI secrets. The destination URL is stored base64-encoded to conceal it from casual inspection, and the typosquat-style package name together with pino-themed documentation form a cover story for the dropper. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/7a1f1382a84618fabc1c45e8b61e9c9cea6ea33f/osv/mal
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-5hx2-mp3m-4gr6 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.