supply chain event / NVI-00010916 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @rutxploit-sec/waves-button-poc (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @rutxploit-sec/waves-button-poc, @rutxploit-sec/waves-button-poc, @rutxploit-sec/waves-button-poc. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@rutxploit-sec/waves-button-poc
source listed= 2.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (435937e521ca52ff4d99fd276136aff40364c4a88a3a4677cecf390c9d9bb600) @rutxploit-sec/waves-button-poc@1.0.0 auto-executes host-identifier exfiltration on both `npm install` and `require`. package.json declares a preinstall script that runs `node -e` code which reads `os.hostname()` and `os.userInfo().username` and issues a plaintext HTTP GET to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://80.225.217.8/poc/dep-confusion-proof.html, passing the package name, host, and user as query parameters. The declared main entry index.js repeats the same behavior at module top level, so any consumer that requires the package also beacons the same identifiers to the same IP. The scoped name and PoC framing are consistent with a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept, but the shipped code performs unauthenticated identifier collection from every installer regardless of intent, and the destination is an attacker-chosen bare IP over cleartext HTTP. --- Credit: OpenSSF (source)
@rutxploit-sec/waves-button-poc
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (435937e521ca52ff4d99fd276136aff40364c4a88a3a4677cecf390c9d9bb600) @rutxploit-sec/waves-button-poc@1.0.0 auto-executes host-identifier exfiltration on both `npm install` and `require`. package.json declares a preinstall script that runs `node -e` code which reads `os.hostname()` and `os.userInfo().username` and issues a plaintext HTTP GET to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://80.225.217.8/poc/dep-confusion-proof.html, passing the package name, host, and user as query parameters. The declared main entry index.js repeats the same behavior at module top level, so any consumer that requires the package also beacons the same identifiers to the same IP. The scoped name and PoC framing are consistent with a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept, but the shipped code performs unauthenticated identifier collection from every installer regardless of intent, and the destination is an attacker-chosen bare IP over cleartext HTTP. --- Credit: OpenSSF (source)
@rutxploit-sec/waves-button-poc
source listed= 3.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (435937e521ca52ff4d99fd276136aff40364c4a88a3a4677cecf390c9d9bb600) @rutxploit-sec/waves-button-poc@1.0.0 auto-executes host-identifier exfiltration on both `npm install` and `require`. package.json declares a preinstall script that runs `node -e` code which reads `os.hostname()` and `os.userInfo().username` and issues a plaintext HTTP GET to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://80.225.217.8/poc/dep-confusion-proof.html, passing the package name, host, and user as query parameters. The declared main entry index.js repeats the same behavior at module top level, so any consumer that requires the package also beacons the same identifiers to the same IP. The scoped name and PoC framing are consistent with a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept, but the shipped code performs unauthenticated identifier collection from every installer regardless of intent, and the destination is an attacker-chosen bare IP over cleartext HTTP. --- Credit: OpenSSF (source)
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-47cj-gh5r-6927 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.