supply chain event / NVI-00010933 / Revision 1
Malicious code in fs-commons (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for fs-commons. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
fs-commons
source listed= 1.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (f7e82e98343807c39ea786017de4d2a7455815424155ca2a856333d895c8a48b) The package presents itself as a filesystem/data-helper library, but its exported getTransactions()/load_transaction_data() functions are a two-file dynamic-code loader. index.js hides the identifiers 'Function', 'require', 'process', 'Buffer', and 'setTimeout' behind a split-string array and obtains the Function constructor indirectly via globalThis.constructor.constructor, defeating static review. At call time it reads the sibling file models.js, which is disguised as an array of product-record objects but whose `mark` fields are base64 ciphertext. loadConfig()/processData() sort the records by id, concatenate every `mark`, apply a per-count Caesar shift, base64-decode the result, and pass the resulting source to the Function constructor with Buffer, require, and process injected, then invoke it. Any consumer that requires fs-commons and calls getTransactions() executes attacker-supplied code with full Node privileges on the host process. The obfuscation, the indirect Function-constructor acquisition, and the disguising of the payload as product metadata in a sibling file have no legiti
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-72c4-xhr8-m5j8 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.