supply chain event / NVI-00010937 / Revision 1
Malicious code in web-vitals-polyfill-core-v1 (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for web-vitals-polyfill-core-v1. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
web-vitals-polyfill-core-v1
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (38311c0f483e9485a7b5e8aa7f9a093a40203d8e1a025c0bf5850c2874cffdfa) The package name mimics the widely-used web-vitals polyfill but the tarball ships disk/index.min.js, a base64-wrapped service-worker payload (self.__PWA_ROUTER__.executeTacticalRouting) that resolves an active destination via DoH TXT lookups of api.chinazhangsan.ccwu.cc (queried through doh.pub and dns.alidns.com) with base64-encoded fallback endpoints on gist.githubusercontent.com/chinazhangsan999-crypto and api.npoint.io, performs decoy fetches, and issues Response.redirect(targetUrl, 302) to the resolved host. package.json declares main: index.js which is not present in the tarball, so the package has no legitimate library surface; its shipped code is exclusively the obfuscated redirector, intended to be loaded into a consuming site's service worker where it can hijack end-user navigation to attacker-chosen destinations resolved at runtime through multi-provider DNS-over-HTTPS and paste-site fallbacks. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/d7d3c91983ca43b861eb619ab6d817344dac390b/osv/malicious/npm/w
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-fx3x-h4mr-m28v ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.