supply chain event / NVI-00010956 / Revision 1
Malicious code in hardhat-kex (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for hardhat-kex. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
hardhat-kex
source listed= 2.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (b8fa212654344b734814cee2291c9b9b91ecbc353bde5e83740624ee5f263c69) The npm package hardhat-kex@2.0.1 ships an obfuscated 4.5MB single-line bundle at lib/config.js (obfuscator.io-style string-array with a 26,234-entry table and numeric-dispatch wrapper, containing exec strings). The package main index.js unconditionally executes this bundle on require via `const config = require('./lib/config')`; the return value is never used, so the sole effect of importing the package is to run the obfuscated code. The surface API exported by index.js is an unrelated stub Express middleware that calls `next()`. The tarball additionally ships verbatim files from the pino logging library (lib/proto.js, levels.js, transport.js, worker.js, redaction.js, docs/, index.d.ts, README.md) despite the package being named for the Hardhat/Ethereum ecosystem and describing itself as a vulnerability-management tool; none of the pino sources are reachable through the exported API. The name/description/API mismatch combined with bundled pino cover-story files is a decoy pattern designed to make the tarball appear legitimate while the obfuscated loader is the only code that actually run
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-g6j9-c37g-6cwx ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.