supply chain event / NVI-00010974 / Revision 1
Malicious code in xcvrenzcompany (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for xcvrenzcompany, xcvrenzcompany, xcvrenzcompany. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
xcvrenzcompany
source listed> 0
This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the "PhantomSub" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID. `package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js` lines 62-99 define `AUTO_FOLLOW_JIDS`, three base64 strings decoded with `Buffer.from(..., "base64")`, and when the connection opens (line 97) schedule a FOLLOW query for each, 90 seconds apart (cited line 85: `await newsletterWMexQuery(jid, QueryIds.FOLLOW);`). Decoded JIDs: `120363400505489366@newsletter`, `120363430764800148@newsletter` and `120363387182851100@newsletter`. There is no opt-out and the behavior is not documented. The npm maintainer account (`xzv-expzc`) also publishes `prastzy`. Line numbers refer to version 2.0.0; the same code is present in every published version listed under `affected`. Static review of the published tarball(s) found no code that sends WhatsApp credentials or ses
xcvrenzcompany
source listed= 1.0.0
This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the "PhantomSub" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID. `package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js` lines 62-99 define `AUTO_FOLLOW_JIDS`, three base64 strings decoded with `Buffer.from(..., "base64")`, and when the connection opens (line 97) schedule a FOLLOW query for each, 90 seconds apart (cited line 85: `await newsletterWMexQuery(jid, QueryIds.FOLLOW);`). Decoded JIDs: `120363400505489366@newsletter`, `120363430764800148@newsletter` and `120363387182851100@newsletter`. There is no opt-out and the behavior is not documented. The npm maintainer account (`xzv-expzc`) also publishes `prastzy`. Line numbers refer to version 2.0.0; the same code is present in every published version listed under `affected`. Static review of the published tarball(s) found no code that sends WhatsApp credentials or ses
xcvrenzcompany
source listed= 2.0.0
This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the "PhantomSub" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID. `package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js` lines 62-99 define `AUTO_FOLLOW_JIDS`, three base64 strings decoded with `Buffer.from(..., "base64")`, and when the connection opens (line 97) schedule a FOLLOW query for each, 90 seconds apart (cited line 85: `await newsletterWMexQuery(jid, QueryIds.FOLLOW);`). Decoded JIDs: `120363400505489366@newsletter`, `120363430764800148@newsletter` and `120363387182851100@newsletter`. There is no opt-out and the behavior is not documented. The npm maintainer account (`xzv-expzc`) also publishes `prastzy`. Line numbers refer to version 2.0.0; the same code is present in every published version listed under `affected`. Static review of the published tarball(s) found no code that sends WhatsApp credentials or ses
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-474r-6338-73gj ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.