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supply chain event / NVI-00010981 / Revision 1

Malicious code in contoso-login-sim-loader (npm)

GitHub lists this malware advisory for contoso-login-sim-loader. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-98rj-4grx-g355

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

contoso-login-sim-loader

source listed
  • = 1.0.1

## Source: amazon-inspector (062ce76699c91a883d24e3ad609bb04faa3f52cbeaecfb24c1c3bcde8b496a5c) Package ships a single ~138 KB browser script whose entire body is an RC4-encrypted base64 blob decoded at runtime by an inline RC4 routine (`_zc`) with a DJB2 helper (`_zh`) and a key reconstructed by XORing a numeric array with 1410^714. Before decryption the script performs anti-analysis guards: a devtools-size heuristic (`if(_gz>160||_gp>160)return;`) that aborts execution when developer tools are open, and a block that overwrites `console.log/info/warn/debug/error` to no-ops to suppress runtime tracing. The package name `contoso-login-sim-loader` self-describes as a 'login sim(ulator) loader' while the published description reframes it as a generic 'Client-side asset loader that renders a self-contained UI component when included via a script tag.' The tarball ships no source, no exports, no dependencies, and no documentation - only the opaque encrypted payload. Any site that follows the include-via-script-tag guidance embeds attacker-controlled JavaScript, decrypted only in end-user browsers, into its own pages; the concealed payload cannot be audited without executing it, and the n

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-98rj-4grx-g355 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

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