supply chain event / NVI-00010988 / Revision 1
Malicious code in css-svqggc-polyfill (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for css-svqggc-polyfill. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
css-svqggc-polyfill
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (6b23cf39720388bcf9f26621bd52e256e18a011bf3b6821b7d9f5f60115b9663) Package masquerades as a CSS polyfill while impersonating internal Wix Thunderbolt registry modules (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, and other namespace stubs), with a shipped registry-manifest pointing those names at parastorage.com URLs under this package's own name — a dependency-confusion shape. thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE on require that purges its own entries from require.cache so each require re-runs the payload, obtains child_process via multiple fallbacks (including constructing a fresh Module instance to bypass sandboxed require stubs), and executes reconnaissance commands (id, whoami, uname -a, ifconfig/ip addr, /etc/hosts) via execSync. The command output plus host beacon fields (node version, platform, pid, hostname, site) are sent over cleartext HTTP via fetch GET to the hardcoded endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/bb8968d0f67000433bf7005dd5ad2d1f. The Proxy-based stub exports ensure the import appears to succeed silently after exfiltration. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](ht
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-67vj-fvv3-m9f5 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.