supply chain event / NVI-00011002 / Revision 1
Malicious code in hardhat-ftp (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for hardhat-ftp. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
hardhat-ftp
source listed= 2.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (5e916c23a0efbd49d3cfcd5993957df7afbade3f454925d0672acc8c9f68245c) The package's declared main entry index.js unconditionally requires./lib/config, a 4,499,968-byte obfuscator.io-packed file (26,234-entry string array, hex-renamed identifiers, control-flow flattening, top-level IIFE) that executes as soon as any consumer runs `require('hardhat-ftp')`. After string-array decoding the loader resolves to execSync and spawn sinks, and the package declares axios as a dependency, giving the import-time payload both outbound HTTP and local command-execution primitives with the concrete command targets concealed behind the obfuscation. The surrounding package is a cover: it is published under the name hardhat-ftp with a vulnerability-management description, but the README headers, badges, and ecosystem links are lifted from pinojs/pino, and the files under lib/ (proto.js, levels.js, transport.js, multistream.js) mirror the pino source tree. The name/README/code mismatch, the scale of the obfuscation, and the presence of exec+HTTP primitives inside the auto-loaded module match the masquerade-dropper pattern: installing or requiring this package triggers execution
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-85mm-jcj2-w79v ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.