supply chain event / NVI-00011053 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @rutxploit-sec/subsplash-google-tag-manager (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @rutxploit-sec/subsplash-google-tag-manager. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@rutxploit-sec/subsplash-google-tag-manager
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (8fe2c746dc5c09bc67257fd4eba671824806c9080b7ca94949e45175deb03b8d) package.json declares a preinstall script that executes inline Node code reading os.hostname() and os.userInfo().username and issuing an HTTP GET to http://127.0.0.1:8099/ carrying those identifiers along with the impersonated package name. The package is published under @rutxploit-sec but its manifest description and index.js console output identify it as representing the private scope @subsplash/google-tag-manager, and any installer whose resolver picks this public name over the intended private package will execute the preinstall code and disclose hostname and username. The beacon destination in this artifact is loopback (127.0.0.1:8099), consistent with a proof-of-concept collector rather than a live external C2, but the install-time execution primitive and dependency-confusion targeting are the full attack shape. --- Credit: OpenSSF (source)
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-fj9p-g7jm-r7x3 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.