supply chain event / NVI-00011094 / Revision 1
Malicious code in ultimate-websocket (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for ultimate-websocket. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
ultimate-websocket
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (7574e423b830695141ee6e089006e0c355109e240c69881512806869cfee8114) package.json declares its only dependency `node-net-pool` as a bare tarball URL pointing at the mutable `main` branch of an unrelated GitHub user (`https://github.com/trktgq0wbre1/node-net-pool/archive/refs/heads/main.tar.gz`), bypassing the npm registry entirely. There is no version pin, no commit SHA, and no integrity hash, so `npm install` fetches whatever bytes that URL currently returns and runs any lifecycle scripts contained in them. The package's own `scripts.postinstall` additionally executes `node -e "...require('node-net-pool')..."`, loading the fetched module at install time so its top-level code also runs on the installer's host. The GitHub account is a throwaway-shaped handle unrelated to the publishing identity, and the shipped tarball contains no real functionality — its only install-time effect is to pull and execute attacker-controlled code from an endpoint whose contents the author can change at any time. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ae1ef40954ea15dd560720d58f647c9880afc699/
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-w8c4-4fjc-rg48 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.