supply chain event / NVI-00011119 / Revision 1
Malicious code in tailwindcss-forms-styles (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for tailwindcss-forms-styles. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
tailwindcss-forms-styles
source listed= 0.5.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (587d9a389f35a8ec2d3ed714c90f7daa43feb6875f4ce2e4280f5ce19569d895) The package name tailwindcss-forms-styles mimics the legitimate @tailwindcss/forms plugin, and its src/index.js copies that plugin's code verbatim as cover. Above the cover code, a top-level IIFE joins a ~140-element base64 string array, atob()-decodes it, and eval()s the result. The decoded loader queries public Ethereum RPC/Blockscout endpoints for the most recent transaction sent by hardcoded address 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a, parses two IPv4 addresses out of the transaction recipient field, downloads an XOR-encoded JavaScript payload from staging URLs of the form http://:443/0x/cls and http://:443/0x/ls, and executes it via eval and a detached spawn('node', ['-e',...]) child process. Because the IIFE runs at module load, any consumer that performs require('tailwindcss-forms-styles') triggers remote code execution on the installer, with the command-and-control endpoint resolved dynamically from the blockchain so the C2 can be rotated without changing the package. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/os
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-6qrh-6qq7-9xjh ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.