vulnerability / NVI-00011692 / Revision 4
Podman: The `podman run` command can be instructed to disable almost all sandboxing by image annotation
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/containers/podman, go.podman.io/podman/v6. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
10 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
10 CRITICAL (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.532%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.44979. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/containers/podman
source listed>= 4.4.0, < 5.8.8
### Impact Podman v4.4.0 added a feature where container checkpoints (from the `podman container checkpoint` command) could be distributed via OCI registry, and pulled from that registry and run via the `podman run` command. This allowed easy transfer of checkpoints between systems. However, checkpoints allow complete control of how the container is created - including full control of the container sandbox. When `podman run` detects a checkpoint, it will silently ignore all user input regarding how the container should be created - for example, `podman run --cap-drop=ALL` on an image that is determined to be a checkpoint will ignore `--cap-drop=all` and use the set of capabilities specified by the checkpoint image instead, which could include all capabilities. Podman identifies checkpoint images by looking for an annotation, `io.podman.annotations.checkpoint.runtime.name`. If this annotation is set, the image is treated as a checkpoint. Conflating container images and checkpoints in `podman run` allows inherently insecure behavior as the image can now control how it is executed. The Podman Maintainers have determined that the safest course of action is to remove this functionality.
go.podman.io/podman/v6
source listed>= 6.0.0, < 6.1.3
### Impact Podman v4.4.0 added a feature where container checkpoints (from the `podman container checkpoint` command) could be distributed via OCI registry, and pulled from that registry and run via the `podman run` command. This allowed easy transfer of checkpoints between systems. However, checkpoints allow complete control of how the container is created - including full control of the container sandbox. When `podman run` detects a checkpoint, it will silently ignore all user input regarding how the container should be created - for example, `podman run --cap-drop=ALL` on an image that is determined to be a checkpoint will ignore `--cap-drop=all` and use the set of capabilities specified by the checkpoint image instead, which could include all capabilities. Podman identifies checkpoint images by looking for an annotation, `io.podman.annotations.checkpoint.runtime.name`. If this annotation is set, the image is treated as a checkpoint. Conflating container images and checkpoints in `podman run` allows inherently insecure behavior as the image can now control how it is executed. The Podman Maintainers have determined that the safest course of action is to remove this functionality.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-2cvf-wqm6-wr9g ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-94603 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-94603 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.