vulnerability / NVI-00011698 / Revision 3
AsyncHttpClient: Replay to a different host sends the original host request and credentials to the new host
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client, org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
9.4 CRITICAL (4.0)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.189%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.08542. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
source listed>= 3.0.0, <= 3.0.12
### Impact When a request is replayed onto a different host, the client updates only the current request and leaves the target request pointing at the original host. Four consumers read that stale value, and each one sends the first host's request, credentials, or both to the second host. A replay happens through documented, ordinary features: a `ResponseFilter` that returns a different request, which is the supported failover pattern, and the IOException retry path. The attacker does not need to induce the replay; an application that uses failover produces it by design. * The socket to host B is filed in the connection pool under host A's key. A later request the application addresses to A is served over the connection to B, and A's `Authorization` header goes to B. * Over a CONNECT tunnel, the client tunnels to B and negotiates TLS with B correctly, then writes A's request into that tunnel. B receives A's path, A's `Host`, and A's `Authorization`. TLS does not protect against this, because the handshake really is with B, so no certificate mismatch occurs. * The replay reuses the original realm, so A's credentials are regenerated onto a replay request that carries no realm of it
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
source listed>= 2.0.0, <= 2.16.0
### Impact When a request is replayed onto a different host, the client updates only the current request and leaves the target request pointing at the original host. Four consumers read that stale value, and each one sends the first host's request, credentials, or both to the second host. A replay happens through documented, ordinary features: a `ResponseFilter` that returns a different request, which is the supported failover pattern, and the IOException retry path. The attacker does not need to induce the replay; an application that uses failover produces it by design. * The socket to host B is filed in the connection pool under host A's key. A later request the application addresses to A is served over the connection to B, and A's `Authorization` header goes to B. * Over a CONNECT tunnel, the client tunnels to B and negotiates TLS with B correctly, then writes A's request into that tunnel. B receives A's path, A's `Host`, and A's `Authorization`. TLS does not protect against this, because the handshake really is with B, so no certificate mismatch occurs. * The replay reuses the original realm, so A's credentials are regenerated onto a replay request that carries no realm of it
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-jmqq-x5g9-9p2w ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-107282 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-107282 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.