vulnerability / NVI-00011799 / Revision 2
Shiny for Python has path traversal in bookmark restore
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for shiny. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.358%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.29549. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
shiny
source listed>= 1.4.0, <= 1.6.3
### Impact Shiny for Python's bookmark-restore path accepted a client-supplied `_state_id_` query-string value and joined it into the server-side bookmark directory (`/shiny_bookmarks/`) without validating it. A value containing `..` path segments, or an absolute path, could therefore cause the server to open and parse `input.json` and `values.json` from a directory outside the bookmark store. On a default application the restore was attempted whenever the client supplied a URL query string — including when bookmarking was disabled (`bookmark_store="disable"`) — so no opt-in configuration was required. For such applications the impact is an unauthenticated, server-side probe for the existence and JSON-validity of attacker-chosen paths, constrained to those two file names. Applications configured with `bookmark_store="server"` **and** using `ui.input_file()` are affected more seriously. The file-input restore handler copies files out of the restore directory, so the contents of an attacker-selected file name within an attacker-selected directory could be read into the application. ### Affected versions 1.4.0 through 1.6.3. Bookmarking was introduced in 1.4.0; earlier r
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-47c3-hpmg-7j6p ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-108258 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.