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vulnerability / NVI-00011836 / Revision 1

shell-quote: `quote()` command injection via a line terminator in a token after a `{ comment }` token

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for shell-quote. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-pqg4-j6r4-53mvCVE-2026-102422

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

8.1 critical

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

shell-quote

source listed
  • >= 1.8.4, < 1.11.0

### Impact `quote()` emits a `{ comment }` token as `#` followed by its text, which comments out the rest of the shell line, including the opening quote of any later string token. A line terminator in that later string ends the comment, and the rest of the string is parsed as shell input: ```js quote(['echo', 'ok', { comment: 'x' }, 'a\nid;#']); // echo ok #x 'a // id;#' ``` Passed to `sh`, `bash`, `dash`, `ksh`, or `zsh`, this runs `id`. `parse()` emits a comment token for a `#` in the middle of a word (for example `http://example.com/#frag`), so callers that combine `parse()` output with another untrusted string, such as `quote(parse(untrustedCommand).concat(untrustedArg))`, are affected. The fix for CVE-2026-9277 rejected line terminators in the comment's own text, but not in the tokens after it. Exploitation requires an attacker-controlled string containing a line terminator that follows a `{ comment }` token in the same `quote()` call. ### Patches Fixed in v1.11.0: `quote()` throws a `TypeError` when a string after a `{ comment }` token contains a line terminator (`\n`, `\r`, U+2028, or U+2029). ### Workarounds Drop every token after a `{ comment }` token before calli

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

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04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

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  1. GHSA-pqg4-j6r4-53mv ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

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  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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