vulnerability / NVI-00011850 / Revision 2
AsyncHttpClient: Cookies received over plaintext HTTP can plant, overwrite or delete Secure cookies set over HTTPS
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client, org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.8 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.294%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.22028. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
source listed>= 3.0.0, <= 3.0.13
### Impact The cookie store ignores the scheme a `Set-Cookie` arrived on. draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-22 (approved to obsolete RFC 6265, in the RFC Editor queue) Section 5.7 requires a user agent to ignore a cookie with the `Secure` attribute unless it arrived over a secure connection (step 13), and to ignore a non-Secure cookie from an insecure connection when it would overlay a Secure cookie the store already holds (step 16). Neither rule is implemented. The only `Secure` handling is on retrieval, where a Secure cookie is not sent over plaintext. So anyone who can answer a plaintext request to a site can set, replace or delete the site's `Secure` cookies, and the next HTTPS request carries the attacker's value back inside TLS: ``` http://example.com -> Set-Cookie: SID=attacker-value; Secure; Path=/ https://example.com -> Cookie: SID=attacker-value ``` This does not need an attacker on the network path. A plaintext host under the same site reaches the HTTPS one by setting a domain cookie: ``` http://insecure.example.com -> Set-Cookie: SID=attacker-value; Secure; Domain=example.com; Path=/ https://bank.example.com -> Cookie: SID=attacker-value ``` A plaintext `Se
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
source listed>= 2.1.0, <= 2.16.1
### Impact The cookie store ignores the scheme a `Set-Cookie` arrived on. draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-22 (approved to obsolete RFC 6265, in the RFC Editor queue) Section 5.7 requires a user agent to ignore a cookie with the `Secure` attribute unless it arrived over a secure connection (step 13), and to ignore a non-Secure cookie from an insecure connection when it would overlay a Secure cookie the store already holds (step 16). Neither rule is implemented. The only `Secure` handling is on retrieval, where a Secure cookie is not sent over plaintext. So anyone who can answer a plaintext request to a site can set, replace or delete the site's `Secure` cookies, and the next HTTPS request carries the attacker's value back inside TLS: ``` http://example.com -> Set-Cookie: SID=attacker-value; Secure; Path=/ https://example.com -> Cookie: SID=attacker-value ``` This does not need an attacker on the network path. A plaintext host under the same site reaches the HTTPS one by setting a domain cookie: ``` http://insecure.example.com -> Set-Cookie: SID=attacker-value; Secure; Domain=example.com; Path=/ https://bank.example.com -> Cookie: SID=attacker-value ``` A plaintext `Se
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-p2jm-6hj6-9rjg ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-107226 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.