vulnerability / NVI-00011915 / Revision 2
mppx-condition-gate: Free-access path grants on a self-declared wallet without proving control
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @insumermodel/mppx-condition-gate, @insumermodel/mppx-token-gate. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.282%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.20891. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@insumermodel/mppx-condition-gate
source listed<= 2.0.3
### Impact Both packages wrap an `mppx` payment method so that a wallet meeting on-chain conditions is granted free access instead of being charged. The free-access path reads the payer address from `credential.source` — a client-supplied DID in the payment credential — asks InsumerAPI whether that address satisfies the configured conditions, and on a pass returns a successful receipt **without ever calling the wrapped payment verifier**. Nothing in that path establishes that the caller controls the wallet it named. Because qualifying wallets are public chain state, an attacker does not need to guess one. Naming any qualifying address in `credential.source` is sufficient to obtain free access to a route that should have been paid for. An in-process cache (default TTL 300s, keyed on wallet and conditions) then re-serves the grant without re-evaluating. mppx documents this requirement explicitly. Its type definitions describe `source` as "an asserted identity, not independent proof of control", and state that methods relying on it "must validate the relationship to the credential payload". These packages did not. **This is a defect in these wrapper packages, not in the attestati
@insumermodel/mppx-token-gate
source listed<= 1.0.3
### Impact Both packages wrap an `mppx` payment method so that a wallet meeting on-chain conditions is granted free access instead of being charged. The free-access path reads the payer address from `credential.source` — a client-supplied DID in the payment credential — asks InsumerAPI whether that address satisfies the configured conditions, and on a pass returns a successful receipt **without ever calling the wrapped payment verifier**. Nothing in that path establishes that the caller controls the wallet it named. Because qualifying wallets are public chain state, an attacker does not need to guess one. Naming any qualifying address in `credential.source` is sufficient to obtain free access to a route that should have been paid for. An in-process cache (default TTL 300s, keyed on wallet and conditions) then re-serves the grant without re-evaluating. mppx documents this requirement explicitly. Its type definitions describe `source` as "an asserted identity, not independent proof of control", and state that methods relying on it "must validate the relationship to the credential payload". These packages did not. **This is a defect in these wrapper packages, not in the attestati
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-jg6q-3qfh-r9f8 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-104891 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.