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vulnerability / NVI-00011948 / Revision 3

wger: API credentials remain valid after logout/password change

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for wger. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-v3x9-6gg8-c2c9CVE-2026-46437

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

4.8 medium

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

EPSS

0.242%

FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.15436. Missing scores are unknown.

As of · FIRST EPSS

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

wger

source listed
  • <= 2.1

### Summary A vulnerability exists in the authentication/session lifecycle of `wger` where **bearer-style API credentials** remain valid **after a user logs out and after a user changes their password**. An attacker who steals a victim’s **DRF authtoken** (`Authorization: Token ...`) or **JWT refresh token** can continue to access protected `/api/v2/*` endpoints until the token is manually rotated/deleted (DRF token) or naturally expires (JWT refresh). lifecycle events do not revoke these credentials: - **Logout** (`/user/logout`) only clears the Django session cookie via `django_logout()` and does not revoke API tokens. - **Password change** updates the password hash, but does not revoke: - existing DRF tokens stored in `authtoken_token` - existing JWT refresh tokens (no server-side revocation list or token versioning); refresh can continue minting new access tokens until refresh expiry. #### Vulnerable Files - `wger/wger/core/views/user.py` (logout implementation) - `wger/settings/settings_global.py` (DRF auth configuration, SimpleJWT defaults) - `wger/settings/main.py` (commonly used production defaults for JWT lifetimes) - `wger/wger/utils/api_token.py` (authtoken rotat

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
  • NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-v3x9-6gg8-c2c9 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. CVE-2026-46437 ↗

    NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog

    Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

  3. CVE-2026-46437 ↗

    FIRST EPSS · official catalog

    Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 3 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  2. Revision 2 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  3. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗