vulnerability / NVI-00011966 / Revision 2
PraisonAI: CodeAgent Executes LLM-Generated Code Without Sandboxing and Leaks All Environment Secrets
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for praisonaiagents. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
10 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
10 CRITICAL (3.1)
disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
10 CRITICAL (4.0)
disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
praisonaiagents
source listed<= 1.6.77
### Summary `CodeAgent._execute_python()` executes LLM-generated Python code in a subprocess with the complete parent-process environment (`os.environ.copy()`), zero AST validation, zero import restrictions, and no sandbox enforcement — even when `CodeConfig(sandbox=True)` is explicitly set. This allows an attacker who can influence LLM output (via prompt injection in agent input, tool results, or ingested content) to exfiltrate all environment secrets (API keys, database credentials, cloud tokens) and execute arbitrary code on the host. ### Details `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/code_agent.py` (lines 253–308): ```python def _execute_python(self, code: str, **kwargs) -> Dict[str, Any]: import subprocess import time import tempfile import os start_time = time.time() # Write code to temp file with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode='w', suffix='.py', delete=False) as f: f.write(code) # ← No AST validation, no import blocking temp_file = f.name try: # Execute in subprocess (basic sandboxing) env = os.environ.copy() # ← FULL parent environment env.update(self._code_config.envi
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-2xv2-w8cq-5gxw ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-61447 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.