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vulnerability / NVI-00011998 / Revision 3

Payload: Bypassed sanitization of user uploaded SVGs

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for payload, payload. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-2pwp-2369-8fg3CVE-2026-105862

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

8.7 high

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

EPSS

0.271%

FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.19548. Missing scores are unknown.

As of · FIRST EPSS

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

payload

source listed
  • < 3.90.0

## Impact A malicious SVG file upload could bypass sanitization, be stored, and execute attacker-controlled JavaScript (XSS) after a user downloads it and opens it. **You are affected if:** - You have a collection configured to upload and allow SVG files which can then be downloaded by users. ## Patches The fix validates SVG content on every upload path and hardens SVG/XML delivery so stored SVGs cannot frame attacker content. Users should upgrade Payload packages to `>= 3.90.0` or `>= 4.0.0-canary.34`. ## Workarounds Disallow SVG uploads, or serve uploaded SVGs as downloads with Content-Disposition: attachment and a strict CSP. These mitigations reduce exposure but do not replace upgrading when the patched release is available.

GitHub Advisory Database

payload

source listed
  • >= 4.0.0-canary.0, < 4.0.0-canary.34

## Impact A malicious SVG file upload could bypass sanitization, be stored, and execute attacker-controlled JavaScript (XSS) after a user downloads it and opens it. **You are affected if:** - You have a collection configured to upload and allow SVG files which can then be downloaded by users. ## Patches The fix validates SVG content on every upload path and hardens SVG/XML delivery so stored SVGs cannot frame attacker content. Users should upgrade Payload packages to `>= 3.90.0` or `>= 4.0.0-canary.34`. ## Workarounds Disallow SVG uploads, or serve uploaded SVGs as downloads with Content-Disposition: attachment and a strict CSP. These mitigations reduce exposure but do not replace upgrading when the patched release is available.

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-2pwp-2369-8fg3 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. CVE-2026-105862 ↗

    FIRST EPSS · official catalog

    Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 3 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  2. Revision 2 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  3. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗