vulnerability / NVI-00012015 / Revision 1
Nginx UI: nginx config directive denylist (ValidateConfigFile) is bypassable via same-line ";" separation → authenticated directive injection (RCE on the official image)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.8 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
source listed< 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
## Summary `config.ValidateConfigFile` is the security control that blocks dangerous nginx directives (`js_*`, `perl_*`, `load_module` of njs/perl modules, `user root`). Its directive scanner is bypassable: it splits the config by newlines and inspects only the FIRST token of each line, but nginx separates directives with `;`, not newlines. Putting a benign directive first and the blocked directive after a `;` on the SAME line defeats every check. The `include` directive is also not on the denylist. As a result, an authenticated caller can inject the exact directives the hardening was meant to block, through EVERY path that calls the validator — `POST /api/configs` (add), the REST config modify endpoint (api/config/modify.go), the MCP `nginx_config_modify` tool, and the site/stream save paths (internal/site/save.go, internal/stream/save.go). On deployments where nginx has the njs/perl module (the official uozi/nginx-ui Docker image ships ngx_http_js_module.so), this leads to code execution in the nginx worker; with `user root` the workers run as root. This is distinct from the config_add gap (the MCP nginx_config_add tool not calling the validator at all): here the validator IS ca
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-cf23-7qxj-xmhr ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.