vulnerability / NVI-00012024 / Revision 3
AsyncHttpClient CookieStore Silently Overrides Caller's Explicit Cookie Header via setHeader (Bypass of CVE-2024-53990 Fix)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client, org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.8 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
6.8 MEDIUM (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.301%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.22908. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
source listed>= 3.0.0, <= 3.0.13
### Impact With the cookie store enabled, which is the default, a `Cookie` header that the caller sets on a request with `setHeader` or `addHeader` is thrown away whenever the store holds any cookie for the request's origin: the request's cookie list is written into that header afterwards and replaces it. CVE-2024-53990 fixed the same problem for cookies added with `addCookie`, but that fix works on the cookie list, and a header set directly never reaches it. This is not limited to a cookie of the same name. A store cookie of any name erases the caller's header, so a request meant to carry the caller's session cookie goes out with only the store's cookies, and where the store has a cookie of the caller's name, the store's value is sent instead. It matters most where one client acts for several users. An application that puts each user's session on the request itself, and shares one client and its default cookie store, sends one user's request with a session cookie the store took from a response to another user. The request runs as that other user, so a user of such an application can have their request served under someone else's session, or someone else's under theirs. ### Aff
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
source listed>= 2.1.0, <= 2.16.1
### Impact With the cookie store enabled, which is the default, a `Cookie` header that the caller sets on a request with `setHeader` or `addHeader` is thrown away whenever the store holds any cookie for the request's origin: the request's cookie list is written into that header afterwards and replaces it. CVE-2024-53990 fixed the same problem for cookies added with `addCookie`, but that fix works on the cookie list, and a header set directly never reaches it. This is not limited to a cookie of the same name. A store cookie of any name erases the caller's header, so a request meant to carry the caller's session cookie goes out with only the store's cookies, and where the store has a cookie of the caller's name, the store's value is sent instead. It matters most where one client acts for several users. An application that puts each user's session on the request itself, and shares one client and its default cookie store, sends one user's request with a session cookie the store took from a response to another user. The request runs as that other user, so a user of such an application can have their request served under someone else's session, or someone else's under theirs. ### Aff
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-107228 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-107228 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.