vulnerability / NVI-00012094 / Revision 3
AsyncHttpClient: Pooled connections can still be shared across NTLM, Negotiate and proxy logins
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client, org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.4 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.188%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.08485. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
source listed>= 3.0.0, < 3.0.14
### Impact The fix for GHSA-vvp4-63h8-v5pm in 3.0.13 folded the authenticated principal into the HTTP/1.1 connection pool key, so that a connection one principal authenticated with NTLM, Kerberos or SPNEGO is not handed to another. It left three cases out. In each, a socket that one identity authenticated can still be drawn by a request belonging to a different identity, and the server serves that request as the first one. 1. **A login with no configured principal.** Kerberos and SPNEGO against the ticket cache or the default JAAS login, which is the usual deployment, leave the realm's principal unset, and the key stayed unscoped in that case. A request to the same host that carries no credentials at all draws the authenticated socket and is served as the service identity. 2. **The proxy realm.** Only the origin realm went into the key. A connection authenticated to a proxy with NTLM or Negotiate is handed to requests of another proxy identity, or of none, and the proxy acts for them as the first identity. 3. **Identities that share a user name.** Only the principal string went into the key, so `CORP\alice` and `OTHER\alice` shared connections, as did two realms differing only in
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
source listed>= 2.0.0, <= 2.16.1
### Impact The fix for GHSA-vvp4-63h8-v5pm in 3.0.13 folded the authenticated principal into the HTTP/1.1 connection pool key, so that a connection one principal authenticated with NTLM, Kerberos or SPNEGO is not handed to another. It left three cases out. In each, a socket that one identity authenticated can still be drawn by a request belonging to a different identity, and the server serves that request as the first one. 1. **A login with no configured principal.** Kerberos and SPNEGO against the ticket cache or the default JAAS login, which is the usual deployment, leave the realm's principal unset, and the key stayed unscoped in that case. A request to the same host that carries no credentials at all draws the authenticated socket and is served as the service identity. 2. **The proxy realm.** Only the origin realm went into the key. A connection authenticated to a proxy with NTLM or Negotiate is handed to requests of another proxy identity, or of none, and the proxy acts for them as the first identity. 3. **Identities that share a user name.** Only the principal string went into the key, so `CORP\alice` and `OTHER\alice` shared connections, as did two realms differing only in
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-v2j5-22fr-j62r ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-107230 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.