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vulnerability / NVI-00012140 / Revision 2

JHipster: Generated Applications Allow Stored XSS via Unrestricted Blob ContentType Opened as Same-Origin Blob

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for generator-jhipster, react-jhipster. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-9ffp-22j7-56r2CVE-2026-107303

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

7.6 high

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

EPSS

0.324%

FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.25434. Missing scores are unknown.

As of · FIRST EPSS

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

generator-jhipster

source listed
  • < 9.4.0

## Summary Applications generated by generator-jhipster v9.2.0 can persist user-controlled Blob ContentType values and later use those values as the MIME type for client-side Blob objects. The shared generated `openFile` helper creates an object URL from the Blob and opens it in a new window. For Blob-bearing entities writable by normal authenticated users, this creates a stored XSS chain: attacker-controlled Blob content and MIME type are stored through the generated REST API, returned to privileged users, and opened as a same-origin Blob document from the generated Angular/React/Vue UI. Exploitability should be confirmed against the generated app’s CSP and target browsers. ## Details The root cause is a trust-boundary failure across generated server and client code. The generated entity REST resource accepts request bodies for entity creation and update. Unless an entity-specific authority is configured, the template omits method-level `@PreAuthorize`, leaving the endpoint available to any authenticated user under the global `/api/**` security rule. The generated DTO/domain/mapper flow stores the companion `ContentType` property as a plain `String` and persists it with

GitHub Advisory Database

react-jhipster

source listed
  • <= 1.0.3

## Summary Applications generated by generator-jhipster v9.2.0 can persist user-controlled Blob ContentType values and later use those values as the MIME type for client-side Blob objects. The shared generated `openFile` helper creates an object URL from the Blob and opens it in a new window. For Blob-bearing entities writable by normal authenticated users, this creates a stored XSS chain: attacker-controlled Blob content and MIME type are stored through the generated REST API, returned to privileged users, and opened as a same-origin Blob document from the generated Angular/React/Vue UI. Exploitability should be confirmed against the generated app’s CSP and target browsers. ## Details The root cause is a trust-boundary failure across generated server and client code. The generated entity REST resource accepts request bodies for entity creation and update. Unless an entity-specific authority is configured, the template omits method-level `@PreAuthorize`, leaving the endpoint available to any authenticated user under the global `/api/**` security rule. The generated DTO/domain/mapper flow stores the companion `ContentType` property as a plain `String` and persists it with

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-9ffp-22j7-56r2 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. CVE-2026-107303 ↗

    FIRST EPSS · official catalog

    Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 2 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  2. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗