vulnerability / NVI-00012177 / Revision 2
ApostropheCMS: The general public can access @apostrophecms/user objects via a relationship (viewRole is not applied to the general public)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for apostrophe. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.387%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.32848. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
apostrophe
source listed< 4.33.0
### Impact Even though it is correctly applied to guests, contributors, etc., `viewRole` is not applied to the general public. This means that a secured content type like `@apostrophecms/user` can in theory be accessed. This is greatly mitigated by the fact that there is no automatic public REST API for any content type. One has to expressly allow it. However, it does mean that developers can make the mistake of setting up a relationship between a content type like a blog post, and `@apostrophecms/user`. This could potentially expose some sensitive information if templates were written poorly, e.g. if they JSON-serialized the entire object. Note that password hashes are NOT affected because they reside in a separate collection. The public demo project and its various flavors must be updated first because it inadvertently relies on the bug. ### Patches 4.33.0 ### Workarounds Never create relationships with `@apostrophecms/user` that are intended for non-admin display. If you need a relationship that expresses authorship, create a separate author piece type to publicly represent that.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-xf6w-q65w-4f2w ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-113653 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.