vulnerability / NVI-00012178 / Revision 1
swoosh has email-derived URL path injection in Microsoft Graph endpoint
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for swoosh. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
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02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
swoosh
source listed>= 1.12.0, < 1.26.3
### Summary `Swoosh.Adapters.MsGraph` builds its Microsoft Graph API request URL by interpolating the sender's email address directly into the URL path (`/users/{from}/sendMail`) without percent-encoding or validation. In applications that derive the `from` address from untrusted or user-influenced input (a relay, a contact form, or a "send as" feature), an attacker can inject URL-special characters into the local part of the address to escape the intended path segment and rewrite the request's path and query string. Because the rewritten request is still sent as the application's authenticated `POST` with its Microsoft Graph bearer token, the attacker can redirect it to other Graph endpoints within the token's scopes. ### Details The flaw is in `lib/swoosh/adapters/ms_graph.ex`. `api_endpoint_url/2` constructs the Graph endpoint by interpolating the email's `from` address into the path `/users/{from}/sendMail`. The `from` value is taken verbatim from the email struct and is neither percent-encoded nor validated against the RFC 5321 character set before being placed into the URL. `deliver/2` then issues an authenticated `POST` to that constructed URL using the application's Grap
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-754j-98wh-57rf ↗
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.