supply chain event / NVI-00012187 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @tvg-mar/tvg-promos-atomic-ui (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @tvg-mar/tvg-promos-atomic-ui. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@tvg-mar/tvg-promos-atomic-ui
source listed= 9.9.10
## Source: amazon-inspector (22c22841398a01b681136598baf046a8ad9ad9ef6d728899a0fbce056ff66369) The package's package.json declares an `install` lifecycle script that runs `node index.js`, which loads `runtime/support/telemetry/probe/impl.js`. That file resolves the `os` and `dns` core modules indirectly through `module.constructor._load` with char-code-array names to avoid appearing in a normal `require` graph, then reads `os.userInfo().username`, `os.hostname()`, and the basename of `process.cwd()`. Those values are concatenated as DNS labels together with a hex-decoded destination domain and issued as a `dns.resolve4` query to a subdomain of `oob.algamil7x.xyz`, a DNS-based out-of-band exfiltration collector. The destination hostname and the core-module names are stored as char-code arrays and decoded at runtime, and the logic is split across helper files (b2e6f8.js/c3f7a9.js) under a `telemetry/probe` cover directory. Every `npm install` of this version therefore leaks the installing user's username, machine hostname, and working-directory name to an attacker-controlled domain, and the obfuscation shows the destination and API surface were deliberately hidden. --- Credit: [Ope
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-fvh3-76xv-7978 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.