supply chain event / NVI-00012293 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @sanzoffc/baileys (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @sanzoffc/baileys. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@sanzoffc/baileys
source listed= 3.0.4
## Source: amazon-inspector (4393cd98419ed1fce683c0fde038bce830873769d85d69e64674df61f68502bc) This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that adds covert remote-controlled behavior driven by the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session. In lib/Socket/socket.js, socketConnect() (invoked from validateConnection on every WebSocket open) reconstructs a URL from a String.fromCharCode char-code array that resolves to https://raw.githubusercontent.com/skyzopedia/NewsletterID/refs/heads/main/VIP_Push.json, fetches that JSON list, and iterates it to issue WhatsApp GraphQL mutations with query_id 7871414976211147 (newsletter subscribe/follow) for each id in the remote-supplied list. The list is hosted on a mutable personal-GitHub branch controlled by a third party, so whoever edits that file determines which actions the installer's WhatsApp account performs. A second helper (generateMessageV) base64+XOR-decodes (key 23) a hardcoded '@newsletter' JID and pairs it with the same query_id 7871414976211147, then schedules the same subscription action 40 seconds after invocation - layered string obfuscation of a fixed destination JID that has no legitimate purpose in a WhatsApp prot
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-grqc-r63w-6845 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.