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supply chain event / NVI-00012297 / Revision 1

Malicious code in chai-logger (npm)

GitHub lists this malware advisory for chai-logger. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-fv5h-7hj3-xq5r

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

chai-logger

source listed
  • = 3.0.2

## Source: amazon-inspector (566e54855d730e8555b93da4f8ea81faba72645079a7adcc3a05ea8bf8ad8ee6) The package presents itself as a Chai logging plugin but its main entry `index.js` requires `./lib/query.js`, a ~4 MB obfuscator.io-encoded module (23,868-entry rotated string array, T/j decoder wrappers, hex-property indirection) that executes at the top level as soon as the package is required. The remaining files under `lib/` (proto.js, levels.js, tools.js, etc.) are verbatim copies of pino source, unrelated to the advertised Chai plugin API — a cover story around the obfuscated blob. `package.json` declares `axios ^1.10.0` as a runtime dependency, and the only reference to axios in the shipped code is inside the obfuscated body of `lib/query.js`, giving the payload an HTTP client whose destination is reconstructed at runtime from the rotated string array. Author metadata points to `jsonspack.com`, unrelated to Chai or pino. The combination of import-time execution of a heavily obfuscated payload, a mismatched cover story, copied third-party source used as filler, and an HTTP client declared only for use inside the obfuscated code is the canonical npm credential/data-stealer shape. --

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-fv5h-7hj3-xq5r ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

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