supply chain event / NVI-00012368 / Revision 1
Malicious code in oracle-redis (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for oracle-redis. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
oracle-redis
source listed= 5.11.3
## Source: amazon-inspector (c800d0651330b1c1cd5d9c5cb2b6966eecefb2d2c28949d0670f485d820db3a6) The package publishes as `oracle-redis` but ships a verbatim copy of the ioredis README, source tree, and repository URL (`git://github.com/luin/ioredis.git`), presenting itself as ioredis under a different name. The `package.json` declares two additional runtime dependencies that are not part of ioredis's real dependency set and are never imported anywhere in the shipped `built/` source: `redis-type-intel` ^1.10.5 and `pino-ulid` ^2.12.2. Because they are ordinary `dependencies` with caret ranges, `npm install oracle-redis` resolves and installs those two packages (and their transitive graph) into the installer's `node_modules`, executing whatever lifecycle scripts they declare, even though nothing in the ioredis code being wrapped ever loads them. The combination of a name-squat lure over a popular library plus unused, caret-pinned extra dependencies is a dependency-delivery shape: the harm, if any, arrives through the transitive install of the extra names rather than through this tarball's own code. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://g
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-8m7m-r8mw-mvq2 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.