vulnerability / NVI-00012916 / Revision 2
Anubis: Policy bypass via client controlled X-Original-URI header
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.8 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.340%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.2746. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis
source listed>= 1.22.0, < 1.26.0
Any HTTP client can bypass Anubis bot protection on the default configuration by adding a single request header. No challenge needs to be solved. Affected versions: v1.22.0 through v1.25.0 (introduced in commit d1d631a, PR #1015) The root cause is in `lib/policy/checker.go`, `PathChecker.Check()`: ```go func (pc *PathChecker) Check(r *http.Request) (bool, error) { originalUrl := r.Header.Get("X-Original-URI") if originalUrl != "" { if pc.regexp.MatchString(originalUrl) { return true, nil } } if pc.regexp.MatchString(r.URL.Path) { return true, nil } return false, nil } ``` The header value comes directly from the client request. The middleware chain never strips it. In reverse proxy mode an attacker fully controls it. The default policy imports `data/common/keep-internet-working.yaml`, which contains path-only ALLOW rules with no other conditions: ```yaml - name: well-known path_regex: ^/\.well-known/.*$ action: ALLOW ``` When `X-Original-URI` matches one of those regexes, the rule fires as ALLOW and the request is forwarded upstream without any challenge or JWT check. # Proof of concept Normal request, gets chal
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-6wcg-mqvh-fcvg ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-62314 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.