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vulnerability / NVI-00012945 / Revision 2

Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for code.gitea.io/gitea, gitea.dev. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xcCVE-2026-59765

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

7.5 medium

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

code.gitea.io/gitea

source listed
  • < 1.27.0

### Summary Gitea has robust SSRF protection via `hostmatcher.NewDialContext()` for webhook and migration clone URLs, which validates resolved IPs at the TCP dial level. However, three code paths use raw `http.Get()` (Go's `DefaultClient`) which completely bypasses this protection, enabling SSRF to internal services and local file read via the `file://` scheme. ### Vulnerable Code **File: `modules/uri/uri.go` (line 32) -- Core vulnerability** ```go func Open(uriStr string) (io.ReadCloser, error) { u, err := url.Parse(uriStr) switch strings.ToLower(u.Scheme) { case "http", "https": f, err := http.Get(uriStr) // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher filtering return f.Body, nil case "file": return os.Open(u.Path) // LOCAL FILE READ via file:// scheme } } ``` **Callers in migration path:** - `services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:340` -- `uri.Open(*asset.DownloadURL)` for release assets - `services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:586` -- `uri.Open(pr.PatchURL)` for PR patches **File: `services/migrations/dump.go` (lines 312, 453)** ```go // Line 312 -- release asset download resp, err := http.Get(*asset.DownloadURL) // Line 453 -- PR

GitHub Advisory Database

gitea.dev

source listed
  • < 1.27.0

### Summary Gitea has robust SSRF protection via `hostmatcher.NewDialContext()` for webhook and migration clone URLs, which validates resolved IPs at the TCP dial level. However, three code paths use raw `http.Get()` (Go's `DefaultClient`) which completely bypasses this protection, enabling SSRF to internal services and local file read via the `file://` scheme. ### Vulnerable Code **File: `modules/uri/uri.go` (line 32) -- Core vulnerability** ```go func Open(uriStr string) (io.ReadCloser, error) { u, err := url.Parse(uriStr) switch strings.ToLower(u.Scheme) { case "http", "https": f, err := http.Get(uriStr) // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher filtering return f.Body, nil case "file": return os.Open(u.Path) // LOCAL FILE READ via file:// scheme } } ``` **Callers in migration path:** - `services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:340` -- `uri.Open(*asset.DownloadURL)` for release assets - `services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:586` -- `uri.Open(pr.PatchURL)` for PR patches **File: `services/migrations/dump.go` (lines 312, 453)** ```go // Line 312 -- release asset download resp, err := http.Get(*asset.DownloadURL) // Line 453 -- PR

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
  • NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. CVE-2026-59765 ↗

    NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog

    Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  2. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗