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vulnerability / NVI-00012975 / Revision 1

vm2: NodeVM `require.external` without an explicit `require.root` grants unrestricted host filesystem access and full RCE

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for vm2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-j3hm-6rg5-mchvCVE-2026-92946

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

10 critical

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

vm2

source listed
  • <= 3.11.6

## Summary `NodeVM`'s `require.external` option lets sandboxed code `require()` local files and npm packages. When `require.external` is enabled and `require.root` is **not explicitly set to a path that excludes `node_modules`**, two defaults combine to fully defeat the sandbox: - `require.root` defaults to **unrestricted** — "if omitted every path is allowed." - `require.context` defaults to **`"host"`** — files loaded this way run through the **real Node.js `require()`**, not inside any vm2 sandbox. Sandboxed code can therefore `require()` a relative or absolute path to vm2's own installed package (`node_modules/vm2`), obtain the real, unwrapped `NodeVM`/`VM` classes, construct a brand-new **unrestricted** nested `NodeVM` instance, and execute arbitrary host OS commands via `child_process`. This is exploitable using **vm2's own documented "Quick Examples" configuration** in `README.md`: ```js const vm = new NodeVM({ require: { external: true, root: './', }, }); ``` `root: './'` reads as a safety restriction but, in any ordinary npm project layout, `./node_modules/vm2` sits inside that same directory tree — so the restriction does not exclude vm2 itself. An appli

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

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Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

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  1. GHSA-j3hm-6rg5-mchv ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

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Public revision history

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  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

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