vulnerability / NVI-00012978 / Revision 3
GraphQL Tools has prototype pollution in well-established utility function `mergeDeep`
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @graphql-tools/utils. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.2 HIGH (4.0)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.452%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.39418. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@graphql-tools/utils
source listed<= 12.0.0
Closed by https://github.com/ardatan/graphql-tools/pull/8423 Mitigated in Hive Gateway by https://github.com/graphql-hive/gateway/pull/2600 A client can alias fields to `constructor`, `__proto__` or `prototype` so that the response keys from two subgraphs collide on those names during result merging. Because `mergeDeep` recursed through inherited properties, the merge walked `{}.constructor` to `Object`, then `Object.__proto__` to `Function.prototype`, and wrote a subgraph-supplied value over `Function.prototype.call`, breaking every subsequent request in the process until restart. This is remotely triggerable by an unauthenticated client with a single query against any supergraph that merges an object from two subgraphs, which is the ordinary `@shareable` or entity case, so it is a denial of service rather than a theoretical hardening issue. ```graphql { shared { fieldA constructor: fieldB { __proto__: child { call: value } } } } ```
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-7mx3-vvmw-hjmv ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-104852 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-104852 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.