vulnerability / NVI-00012988 / Revision 1
Multiple @opentelemetry/instrumentation-* packages expose database username via unconditional db.user span attribute
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver, @opentelemetry/instrumentation-tedious, @opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledb, @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongoose, @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.8 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver
source listed< 0.66.0
### Impact Multiple `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-*` packages recorded the database connection username as the `db.user` span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was not gated by `enhancedDatabaseReporting` or any other opt-in flag, and it was the **default** behaviour for all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23. The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal: - Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology. - Role-encoded usernames (e.g. `admin_readwrite`, `app_readonly_prod`) useful for privilege inference. - Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration. Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below): | Package | Vulnerable range | Patched version | |---------|-----------------|-----------------| | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver` | `< 0.66.0` | `0.66.0` | | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-k
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-tedious
source listed< 0.40.0
### Impact Multiple `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-*` packages recorded the database connection username as the `db.user` span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was not gated by `enhancedDatabaseReporting` or any other opt-in flag, and it was the **default** behaviour for all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23. The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal: - Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology. - Role-encoded usernames (e.g. `admin_readwrite`, `app_readonly_prod`) useful for privilege inference. - Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration. Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below): | Package | Vulnerable range | Patched version | |---------|-----------------|-----------------| | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver` | `< 0.66.0` | `0.66.0` | | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-k
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledb
source listed< 0.46.0
### Impact Multiple `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-*` packages recorded the database connection username as the `db.user` span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was not gated by `enhancedDatabaseReporting` or any other opt-in flag, and it was the **default** behaviour for all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23. The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal: - Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology. - Role-encoded usernames (e.g. `admin_readwrite`, `app_readonly_prod`) useful for privilege inference. - Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration. Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below): | Package | Vulnerable range | Patched version | |---------|-----------------|-----------------| | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver` | `< 0.66.0` | `0.66.0` | | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-k
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongoose
source listed< 0.67.0
### Impact Multiple `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-*` packages recorded the database connection username as the `db.user` span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was not gated by `enhancedDatabaseReporting` or any other opt-in flag, and it was the **default** behaviour for all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23. The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal: - Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology. - Role-encoded usernames (e.g. `admin_readwrite`, `app_readonly_prod`) useful for privilege inference. - Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration. Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below): | Package | Vulnerable range | Patched version | |---------|-----------------|-----------------| | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver` | `< 0.66.0` | `0.66.0` | | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-k
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql
source listed< 0.67.0
### Impact Multiple `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-*` packages recorded the database connection username as the `db.user` span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was not gated by `enhancedDatabaseReporting` or any other opt-in flag, and it was the **default** behaviour for all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23. The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal: - Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology. - Role-encoded usernames (e.g. `admin_readwrite`, `app_readonly_prod`) useful for privilege inference. - Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration. Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below): | Package | Vulnerable range | Patched version | |---------|-----------------|-----------------| | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver` | `< 0.66.0` | `0.66.0` | | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-k
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-knex
source listed< 0.65.0
### Impact Multiple `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-*` packages recorded the database connection username as the `db.user` span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was not gated by `enhancedDatabaseReporting` or any other opt-in flag, and it was the **default** behaviour for all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23. The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal: - Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology. - Role-encoded usernames (e.g. `admin_readwrite`, `app_readonly_prod`) useful for privilege inference. - Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration. Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below): | Package | Vulnerable range | Patched version | |---------|-----------------|-----------------| | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver` | `< 0.66.0` | `0.66.0` | | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-k
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql2
source listed< 0.67.0
### Impact Multiple `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-*` packages recorded the database connection username as the `db.user` span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was not gated by `enhancedDatabaseReporting` or any other opt-in flag, and it was the **default** behaviour for all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23. The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal: - Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology. - Role-encoded usernames (e.g. `admin_readwrite`, `app_readonly_prod`) useful for privilege inference. - Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration. Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below): | Package | Vulnerable range | Patched version | |---------|-----------------|-----------------| | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver` | `< 0.66.0` | `0.66.0` | | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-k
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-pg
source listed< 0.73.0
### Impact Multiple `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-*` packages recorded the database connection username as the `db.user` span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was not gated by `enhancedDatabaseReporting` or any other opt-in flag, and it was the **default** behaviour for all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23. The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal: - Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology. - Role-encoded usernames (e.g. `admin_readwrite`, `app_readonly_prod`) useful for privilege inference. - Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration. Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below): | Package | Vulnerable range | Patched version | |---------|-----------------|-----------------| | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver` | `< 0.66.0` | `0.66.0` | | `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-k
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-qqmp-wf37-98f9 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.