vulnerability / NVI-00013047 / Revision 2
social-auth-core Vulnerable to Account Takeover via Identity Binding Flaw in Vend Backend
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for social-auth-core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.8 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
6.8 MEDIUM (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
social-auth-core
source listed< 5.0.0
### Impact The Vend OAuth2 backend used only the numeric Vend `user_id` as the social-auth UID. When multiple Vend shops authenticate through the same application, users from different shops with the same internal Vend user ID could collide in the social-auth association table. A user from one shop could then be authenticated as the local account previously associated with the same numeric user ID from another shop. The issue affects applications using the Vend OAuth2 backend with more than one Vend shop. ### Patches The issue has been fixed by scoping Vend social-auth UIDs by shop. Users should upgrade to a patched version. Fix: * https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/pull/1795 ### Workarounds Applications that cannot upgrade immediately should restrict the Vend OAuth2 backend to a single trusted Vend shop. If Vend authentication is not required, the Vend backend can also be disabled by removing it from `SOCIAL_AUTH_AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS`. There is no complete workaround while continuing to allow authentication from multiple Vend shops with the vulnerable backend. ### Credits Reported through GitHub private vulnerability reporting by Liyi Zhou, Ziyue Wa
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-fp7w-m676-w7gc ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-57176 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.