vulnerability / NVI-00013052 / Revision 3
Gardener: Authorization Bypass via Group Subject Injection
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/gardener/gardener, gardener/gardener, gardener/gardener. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.5 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
5.5 MEDIUM (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.389%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.33022. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/gardener/gardener
source listed< 1.142.6
## Overview The `manage-members` custom verb authorization check in the Gardener API server's `customverbauthorizer` admission plugin can be bypassed by adding `Group` or `ServiceAccount` subjects to a Project's member list. The check is documented as controlling "human users or groups", but the implementation only gates changes to `User`-kind subjects. A project admin (without `manage-members` permission) can add arbitrary Group subjects - including `system:authenticated` - granting all authenticated users full project-level access. ## Technical Details The official Gardener documentation at `docs/usage/project/projects.md:90-92` explicitly states: However, the `mustCheckProjectMembers()` function at `admission.go` compares old and new member lists using `findHumanUsersWithRoles()`, which only tracks subjects where `isHumanUser()` returns true: ```go func mustCheckProjectMembers(oldMembers, members []core.ProjectMember, owner *rbacv1.Subject, userInfo user.Info) bool { if apiequality.Semantic.DeepEqual(oldMembers, members) { return false
gardener/gardener
source listed>= 1.143.0, < 1.143.3
## Overview The `manage-members` custom verb authorization check in the Gardener API server's `customverbauthorizer` admission plugin can be bypassed by adding `Group` or `ServiceAccount` subjects to a Project's member list. The check is documented as controlling "human users or groups", but the implementation only gates changes to `User`-kind subjects. A project admin (without `manage-members` permission) can add arbitrary Group subjects - including `system:authenticated` - granting all authenticated users full project-level access. ## Technical Details The official Gardener documentation at `docs/usage/project/projects.md:90-92` explicitly states: However, the `mustCheckProjectMembers()` function at `admission.go` compares old and new member lists using `findHumanUsersWithRoles()`, which only tracks subjects where `isHumanUser()` returns true: ```go func mustCheckProjectMembers(oldMembers, members []core.ProjectMember, owner *rbacv1.Subject, userInfo user.Info) bool { if apiequality.Semantic.DeepEqual(oldMembers, members) { return false
gardener/gardener
source listed>= 1.144.0, < 1.144.2
## Overview The `manage-members` custom verb authorization check in the Gardener API server's `customverbauthorizer` admission plugin can be bypassed by adding `Group` or `ServiceAccount` subjects to a Project's member list. The check is documented as controlling "human users or groups", but the implementation only gates changes to `User`-kind subjects. A project admin (without `manage-members` permission) can add arbitrary Group subjects - including `system:authenticated` - granting all authenticated users full project-level access. ## Technical Details The official Gardener documentation at `docs/usage/project/projects.md:90-92` explicitly states: However, the `mustCheckProjectMembers()` function at `admission.go` compares old and new member lists using `findHumanUsersWithRoles()`, which only tracks subjects where `isHumanUser()` returns true: ```go func mustCheckProjectMembers(oldMembers, members []core.ProjectMember, owner *rbacv1.Subject, userInfo user.Info) bool { if apiequality.Semantic.DeepEqual(oldMembers, members) { return false
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-gfjv-gqf2-c888 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-79767 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-79767 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.