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vulnerability / NVI-00013054 / Revision 1

Duplicate Advisory: Title Authenticated Remote Code Execution in validate_code via Malicious Decorators Description

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for langflow. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedwithdrawnGHSA-qqw9-2vj9-hx7r

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

langflow

source listed
  • >= 1.7.2, < 1.10.1

## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-w584-2h2r-2hvf. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description langflow-ai langflow v1.9.3 is affected by: Code Injection. The impact is: execute arbitrary code (remote). The component is: src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/validate.py:validate-post_validate_code-a-real-authenticated-http-post-to-api-v1. The attack vector is: Attack surface: HTTP or browser-backed service path. A public-facing route accepts raw Python source and forwards it into a server-side compile/exec validation path without any visible entitlement guard. ¶¶ A weakness has been identified in langflow-ai langflow up to 1.9.3. langflow contains a code injection vulnerability in validate-post_validate_code-a-real-authenticated-http-post-to-api-v1 (src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/validate.py:13). An authenticated attacker can execute arbitrary Python code on the server by submitting malicious code to the /api/v1/validate/code endpoint, which directly executes user-supplied code without sandboxing or security controls.

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-qqw9-2vj9-hx7r ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

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