vulnerability / NVI-00013095 / Revision 1
Trigger.dev: Server-side request forgery via unvalidated webhook alert-channel URL
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for trigger.dev. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.7 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
trigger.dev
source listed< 4.5.2
### Summary A project member can create a webhook alert channel whose delivery URL points at an internal address, and trigger.dev's control plane will send the alert there with no SSRF protection. The webhook URL is stored as an unvalidated string and is fetched directly from the webapp server, so a low-privilege authenticated user can make the server issue POST requests to internal-only services and cloud metadata endpoints (for example http://169.254.169.254/). No private-IP, scheme, or redirect filtering exists anywhere in the webapp. ### Details The delivery sink performs a raw fetch to the stored URL, apps/webapp/app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:949 (#deliverWebhook): ```js const response = await fetch(webhook.url, { method: "POST", headers: { "content-type": "application/json", "x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256": signatureHex, }, body: rawPayload, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000), }); ``` The same pattern is in apps/webapp/app/v3/services/alerts/deliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:245. The URL is never validated. The stored shape is a bare string, apps/webapp/app/models/projectAlert.server.ts:6: ```js url: z.string(), // not even .url() ``` Th
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-xxv7-2vv3-h682 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.