vulnerability / NVI-00013109 / Revision 1
OpenZeppelin Confidential Contracts `VestingWalletConfidential`: a malicious ERC-7984 token is able to extract private data from the vesting wallet
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @openzeppelin/confidential-contracts, @openzeppelin/confidential-contracts, @openzeppelin/confidential-contracts. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@openzeppelin/confidential-contracts
source listed< 0.3.2
### Impact Two locations consume an encrypted handle returned by an untrusted external party and use it without verifying that the party is ACL-authorized on it. #### `VestingWalletConfidential` Malicious users can call `release` with a malicious token. This token could return an alternative handle on `confidentialBalanceOf`, which represents the balance of the vesting wallet on an alternative ERC-7984 token (or any other handle that the vesting wallet has access to). The vesting wallet does not check that the token has ACL access and grants access to a new handle derived from the returned handle. Effectively, this bug allows a malicious user to gain information about any private `euint64` handle that the vesting wallet has access to via a malicious ERC-7984 token. There is no loss of funds. #### ERC7984 On a transfer with callback, `ERC7984` uses the `ebool` returned by the recipient's `IERC7984Receiver.onConfidentialTransferReceived` to drive the refund logic, without checking that the recipient has ACL access to it. A malicious recipient can return any `ebool` the token has access to and recover its plaintext from the refund result, which the token grants the caller access
@openzeppelin/confidential-contracts
source listed>= 0.4.0-rc.0, < 0.4.2
### Impact Two locations consume an encrypted handle returned by an untrusted external party and use it without verifying that the party is ACL-authorized on it. #### `VestingWalletConfidential` Malicious users can call `release` with a malicious token. This token could return an alternative handle on `confidentialBalanceOf`, which represents the balance of the vesting wallet on an alternative ERC-7984 token (or any other handle that the vesting wallet has access to). The vesting wallet does not check that the token has ACL access and grants access to a new handle derived from the returned handle. Effectively, this bug allows a malicious user to gain information about any private `euint64` handle that the vesting wallet has access to via a malicious ERC-7984 token. There is no loss of funds. #### ERC7984 On a transfer with callback, `ERC7984` uses the `ebool` returned by the recipient's `IERC7984Receiver.onConfidentialTransferReceived` to drive the refund logic, without checking that the recipient has ACL access to it. A malicious recipient can return any `ebool` the token has access to and recover its plaintext from the refund result, which the token grants the caller access
@openzeppelin/confidential-contracts
source listed>= 0.5.0-rc.0, < 0.5.2
### Impact Two locations consume an encrypted handle returned by an untrusted external party and use it without verifying that the party is ACL-authorized on it. #### `VestingWalletConfidential` Malicious users can call `release` with a malicious token. This token could return an alternative handle on `confidentialBalanceOf`, which represents the balance of the vesting wallet on an alternative ERC-7984 token (or any other handle that the vesting wallet has access to). The vesting wallet does not check that the token has ACL access and grants access to a new handle derived from the returned handle. Effectively, this bug allows a malicious user to gain information about any private `euint64` handle that the vesting wallet has access to via a malicious ERC-7984 token. There is no loss of funds. #### ERC7984 On a transfer with callback, `ERC7984` uses the `ebool` returned by the recipient's `IERC7984Receiver.onConfidentialTransferReceived` to drive the refund logic, without checking that the recipient has ACL access to it. A malicious recipient can return any `ebool` the token has access to and recover its plaintext from the refund result, which the token grants the caller access
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-29h2-jr22-frmh ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.